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ABSmCI
The extent to which the duties and functions of 
the President of the United States, as set down by the 
Constitution, are fulfilled depends on the nan holding 
office and on his concept of that position. In study­
ing the political career of John F# Kennedy it is possible 
to trace his concept of that office, changes in that view, 
and the action taken to fulfill a U  aspects of that notion#
4 study of President Kennedy*s speeches, press 
Interviews, literary efforts,, and governmental actions 
point out the changes in Kennedy*s concept of the office 
in both its domestic and international aspects# These 
primary sources extend from his first Congressional term 
in 19^ through his Presidential term ending in 1963#
It is the aim of this thesis to discuss the con­
ceptual changes that occurred before and after President 
Kennedy was elected to that office and to examine some 
factors influencing these diverse opinions# An attempt 
will be made to discuss the relationship of President 
Kennedy* s idea of the presidency to Cl) the Constitutionally- 
based traditional concept! (2) his own gradually changing 
notion of the office; and (3) the manner in which his view 
of the presidential role was implemented#
iii
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fh# personal biography of Jcim ft tswiady m  m&l a® 
various accounts of years h« spirit in to* Hsus# of R«pr«- 
aontatlvea, to too Scanto# and to too M t o  Houaa l»v» tocos# 
fairly *@11 hmom to too individual intorsstod to ourrsat owents 
and to  J to itto to  ULstovar*
Jstsi ®$to§»rsld Samsd? was to# 35to President of 
too tfSitod itotoo# that fact aton# would s#rr« to oxgtoto 
•oat of too totoroftf pooflo have I M  to toto m m  sad to iito 
life hiatory. Tto foot do®s not, however, proflwot too eatir® 
pie tom. Xanoady was ncpi toon m President to too tooriooa 
psopi* or « political leader to to# peoples of too tem world. 
His thoughts sad action* wars constantly tossed to too American 
nation and to other areas of too world through radio* toloiri- 
sion and newspaper sarvissa* fto Ansrieaa oltiaan was sad* 
swart of toe fact tost Kennedy was concerned with too continued 
•assess of tot political system under which tot Oat tod Stotoa 
had opasatad sins# 1?S9 'tod wito tot
of America*® young people to oxisur# future progress, this 
concern also a m i  to ato# l#tsti#% understood and «oapr#h«n- 
aifel# to toe ordinary cl U  sen of an. ago wtor# politics ssoaoti
1
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confused and confusing. His goals for himself and for the 
nation were high, hut idealism seemed to he the answer* The 
young are Inclined to he idealistic, and youth responded to 
Kennedy.
To idealistic, young people, to skeptical intellectualst 
to Americans weary of the materialism and mass culture 
of their societyy he struck all the right notes* They 
listened to his eloquence, were fascinated by his 
style, approved his distinction and his wit.l
Kennedy was a young man driving to the top* His 
push for the presidential nomination and for eventual election 
worn him both criticism2 and admiration. His name became a 
household word not only In the Halted States but in many 
countries throughout the world* Mistakes were made, but they 
were explained away as mistakes. Responsibility was accepted 
by the President# He did not suffer from such acceptance* It 
became a matter of honour* ; The abortive attempt to rid Cuba 
of Castro, culminating in the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and the re­
sultant furor caused by American complicity was a low point in 
a political career that never seemed to reach a zenith, but 
seemed to keep climbing* Setbacks occurred, but the Kennedy 
name rose above them#
The explanation of the Kennedy M phenomenon” and of 
the Kennedy popularity lies in the man himself. The president 
became the living image of a young man on the move*3 He was
%aa Wicker, "Kennedy was a Pomander, Johnson is an 
Accompllsher", Detroit Free Press. January 20, 1965*
%ee V. hasky, JLM*s 3Eht„iiia...infl, (Hew York,
1962).
3§ee Jim Bishop, A Bar in the Life of President Kennedy, 
(lew York, 196*0.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3the All-American boy, the Superman of Polities, capable of 
achieving the impossible and sometimes more, tout he was not a 
man one could deal with objectively*
Kennedy’s opponents held the Bay of Pigs up for 
scrutiny and recalled the so-called double dealing that oecurmd. 
Els supporters studied that same incident and stated that such 
action could be explained, Kennedy's advisors were misinformed, 
he trusted that Information, and he had no reason to question 
the advice of governmental experts.
The domestic crisis over civil rights, the riots in 
Mississippi, the use of federalized troops in Alabama and the 
governmental pressure exerted on the steel companies led to 
charges, of a growth in' the power of the central government, a 
growth that, unchecked, could mean, an end to the private enter­
prise system on which the United States was founded. Those 
same incidents and the actions taken in response to those events 
were cited by Kennedy supporters as necessary for the welfare 
of the United States and as the result of conscientious think­
ing and strong conviction*
John F, Kennedy was the man to be admired, copied, 
criticized when things did not go as well as some thought they 
should* He was the man of the sixties, the man of the hour*
The exact worth of that hour will not be decided in the years 
or decades immediately following its destruction, but an attempt 
will be made here to discuss some of the aspects that might 
possibly shed some light on Kennedy's significance*
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
II
THE CHANGING CMQ&T OF THE PRESIDENCY
Xht ,Coaa.Ujfea^m3..
No foreign institution compares with the American 
Presidency# It has bean said that th® President 
of th® Halted States Is hath more and less than a 
king, nor® and less than a prime minister, and may 
act as either or both at the same time, when nee* 
essary ... Th# President's high off lee la a unique 
amalgam of prerogatives that make him, if he chooses 
to exercise these, the most powerful elected official 
on earth*1*
The personality, the foreefulness of th® man ©loo­
ted to the office of President determines, to a large extent, 
the prestige and power of the Presidency* The American Pres­
idency is more than th© sum of Its parts or the aggregation 
of the powers and functions of that office* The Presidency 
is an elective office, established by Constitutional provi­
sion, and molded by the man in office#^ The Presidency is 
not restricted to the Constitutional concept envisioned by 
the Framers of that document,' but has become the product of 
an historical evolution*
Every man who has ever served as President of the 
United States has added something to —  and per­
haps subtracted something from — .the role of the 
Presidency during his incumbency.0
^enry haCossitt, "Politics for Americans —  The Presidency", 
Hit,,,11111111, Mi,Of Fol* lb, May-duse, 1961, p.16*
%f%ger, J*P, Harris, H i t , » (Toronto, 
1963), pp* 1-2* ■
6Ibld*. p* 2.
b
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5th® Presidency! a* established by the Constitution, 
does, in feet, stand out in stark contrast t© the actual pro­
gressive development of that office*
the authority of the Chief Executive today rests 
on far more than the loos® constitutional founda­
tion. It is the composite of the powers asserted 
by Presidents during the history of the Republic, 
which have, by dint of repeated exercise, attained 
the status of powers authorised by constitutional 
usage or convention.?
This progressive expansion of the Presidency can 
be traced from the first Constitutional concept to that of 
present day politicians*
.lit, JsMifcili, Efaamt
The office of the American Presidency, as estab­
lished in 1789, was designed to “reproduce the monarchy of
g
George III, with th© corruption left out.»,v This reproduc­
tion was not Intended to be an exact duplication of the 
British monarchy, tut was to be a revised edition of the 
British executive* Colonial experience had dictated the need 
for revision. Th® abuses inherent in the reign of George III 
were to be avoided at all cost* The Framers of the Constitu­
tion were apprehensive about anything that was strictly Brit­
ish in nature .as well as toward anything presenting even the
possibility of a corrupt usurpation of power on the part of
^Bernard Schwarts, h............................ .ti£
the, C»ew fork, 1963), Fart I, Vol. II, p. b.
^Edward g, Corwin, the Frasldsnti Qffte, ftfld 
(lew York, 1957)# 9* If*
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tii# executive*9
The opponent# of a strong Chief Executive based 
their stand on the English fe&ig belief that th# legislative 
power, fey Its very nature, served the popular will, while 
th# executive power wast by nature, moaarchlal* At this 
tine th# image presented by the Monarchy of Georg© III 
equated aonarchl&l rul# with tyrannical ml#*10 The con­
clusion reached by these m m  rested on th© belief that "the 
President should be nothing store than an institution for 
carrying the will of the Legislature into effect."1*
On the other hand, supporters of a strong Presidency 
held a view consistent with that expressed by Ooveraeur Morris
It Is necessary that th# Executive Magistrate should 
be the guardian of the people* even of the lower 
classes, against Legislative tyranny, against the 
treat and the wealthy who* In the course of things, 
will necessarily eonpose —  the Legislative Body*
Wealth tends to corrupt the mind and nourish, its 
love of power, and to stimulate It to oppression, 
history proves this to be the spirit of the opulent 
i«. The executive therefore ought to be so consti­
tuted as to be the great protector of the Hass of 
the people*12 ^  r
The decision finally reached at the Constitutional 
Convention called for a Chief Executive whose powers were to 
be United by Constitutional provision. The limitations 
placed on the fresident followed, to son# extent, the theories
pp. I5-M. 
l°Egger A Harris, on.eit*. p. 6. 
lllbld., p* 6* 
l^Ibid.» p. #, In.
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7developed by both Montesquieu end Blackstone* This eon- 
cept of a balanced constitution exhibited the Idea of "a 
divided Initiative In the natter of legislation and a 
broad range of autonomous executive power or prerogative."13 
the President, for example, m s  given the power to sake 
treaties, provided he had obtained the advice and consent 
of the Senate, two-thirds of those Senators present and 
voting agreeing to the terras of the treaty. This depend­
ency on Senate approval of treaties strengthened the 
existence of the system of checks and balances and, at the 
same time, provided the machinery necessary for the devel­
opment of th® separation of powers doctrine.
The Constitution stated the functions and duties 
of the President In general rather than specific terms? 
for example| Article 11, Section I, paragraph 1 states that 
"the executive power shall be vested In a President of the 
United States of America*" The definition of the office 
itself Is expressed In broad terms, the limits of authority 
left almost completely to the Interpretation desired by the 
man In office. Th® President had been vested with the ex­
ecutive power in the government, "the vulnerable part of 
any republic*"^ He had been limited to some extent in 
the exercise of powers ranging from the making of treaties 
to the appointment of ambassadors, public consuls and min­
isters, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers
13Corwin, on.clt.. p. lb.
^Schwarts, op.clt.f p. 3.
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of the United States* And yet, he had been named Coamander- 
ia-Chief of '♦the army and the nary of the United States, 
and of the militia of the several States, when sailed into 
the actual service of the United States.” (Article II, Sec* 
tion II, paragraph 1.) The powers of the President, while 
considered necessary for the preservation of the union, as 
outlined by the Constitution, lack th® detailed precision 
characteristic of the articles defining the authority of 
the other governmental branches*2^  A personal development 
of the office, of its powers and functions, m s  implicitly 
called for In the Constitution.
This Implied self-determination of action has en­
abled the office to develop along the lines considered most 
beneficial In reference to the needs of the nation at any 
particular tim©.2^
the prevailing American dream in 17&9 conjured 
a predominately rural republic, with a President 
to execute and administer the lawsf but these 
laws were to be passed by a Congress of elected 
representatives of the people* in which reposed 
the real governmental power.1"
The intent of the Framers of the Constitution then 
was to establish an executive with specific powers and to 
place restrictions on those powers in the form of a legis­
lative body dwdly elected and authorised by the citizen pop­
ulation, with the added safeguard of an independent Judicial
^Schwartz, op,clt.f pp. 1-3#
16Ibid.. pp. 1-3*
■^LaCossltt, os.elt.. p. 17.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
body* This was tbs original concept of tbs presidency*
The Constitution resolved tbs problem of setting up a
national executive "which was both potent enough to deal
effectively with the problems facing the nation andf at
the same time, not so strong that it would overwhelm the
other two departments.”18 The basic security against an
abuse of power on the part of the President was placed
.in reliance on the tenet of public responsibility*
Where all power is derived from the people* and 
public functionaries, at short intervals, de­
posit it at the feet of the people, to be re­
sumed again, only at their will, individual 
fears may be alarmed by the monsters of imagi­
nation, but individual liberty can be in little
danger*19
.
'The presidency today follows the outlines set
down in general terms by the Constitution in 1739, but the
demands of time, th© pressure of the constantly changing
international and national political scenes have enlarged
the scope of power and influence, and have served to clearly
affirm th© impact of personality m  the prestige and might
of the office itself*
The presidency is distinctly more powerful* It 
cuts deeply into the powers of Congresst in 
fact* it has suite reversed tide expectations of 
the framers by becoming itself a vortex into which 
these powers have been drawn in massive amounts*
It cuts deeply into the lives of the people ...
Whether as legislator, opinlon-maker, eoamander,
l8Schwarts, PP* 2-3*
^ibid*, p* 3#
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10
or administrator, the president molds lasting
fallen In ©very sector of American life*20
The office of the President of th© United States 
held a position of dignity daring Washington's term as 
Chief Ixecutiv©. Th© prestige of the nan himself served 
as a spotlight on the office and focused attention ©a the 
presidency at a tiae when the preponderance of an elected 
legislative body, the Congress of the United States, was 
uppermost in the minds of the young nation's leaders* Th© 
struggle for legislative supremacy as opposed to presi­
dential autonomy had been resolved, to some extent, by the 
Constitution* A controversy involving th© nature of exec­
utive power occurred in spite of the stature and prestige 
of Washington.25' The Proclamation of Neutrality in 1793 
serves as a precise case in point of this controversy, 
Jefferson, Secretary of State in Washing ton* a 
Cabinet, held that such a proclamation could not be made 
on the constitutional grounds that "such a declaration was 
a declaration of no war and it was not for the Executive to 
decide the question of war on the negative or the affirm­
ative side*1*22 This notion that the power of the executive 
was faced with limitations in regard to authority carried 
through into Jefferson*» own term as President, at least on
2%Hnt©ii lossiter, (New York,
1956, pp. oO—ol•
Committee on Government Operations, J&igst
m i  f .
(Washington, 195/)* PP* 15-16*
22Committ©e on Government Operations, on.clt.* p.16.
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a theoretical basis*2^
 ^ Alexander Hamilton, also a member of Washington1 s 
Cabinet, halt a slaw directly opposing Jefferson*s. In 
essence Hamilton argued that the executive power clause in 
Article 11 of the Constitution was a grant of power in it* 
self and authorized Washington's action in the natter of 
neutrality.2**
In the years following Washington's tern of office, 
the concept of the presidency and the extent of presidential 
powers reaained eomparatively static,* the election of 
Andrew Jackson was to alter radically the earlier Ideas of 
the President and M s  authority. Th® Jacksonian concept 
of the presidency revolved around the notion of presidential 
autonomy. He contended that "the President's duty to the 
Constitution is solely the duty of conscience that his oath 
imposes."2^
In defending his position concerning presidential
supremacy Jackson stated that*
...it was settled by the Constitution, the laws 
and the whole practice of the government that 
the entire executive power is vested in the 
President of the Halted States.2®
The Jacksonian concept provided the basis on which 
Abraham Lincoln was to defend M s  presidential actions.
2%or*iaf op.cit.y p. 307* theory Jefferson supported 
the supremacy of th© legislature over executive autonomy. In 
reality, M s  personality controlled Congress*
^Ccaralttee on Governaent Operations, op.cit.. p* IS.
2^Corwin, op.ctt.f P. 311*
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12
Mneal&t in claiming that the president had the power to 
meet an emergency without waiting for Congressional action, 
derived M s  authority fro® the notion held by Jackson and 
fro® the precedent set by the Supreme Court decision, in 
Luther v#. Borden (X8bp)t that insurrection is war*2?
Lincoln's claim was not accepted without opposi­
tion* Chief Justice fancy held that
...to suppose that the President could act on 
M s  own judgment is to fvppoc** that he be** 
conferred upon him more regal, and absolute power 
over the liberty of the cltlsen than the people 
of Unhand have thought it safe to intrust to 
the Crown —  a power which the Queen of Sngland 
cannot exercise at this day and wM gh could not 
have bean lawfully exercised by the sovereign 
even in the reign of Charles tee First**©
' Lincoln, on tee other hand, saw the President as
a leader answerable to tee people*
He.must choose tee hard duty of preserving tec 
Union, even if it meant tee violation of every 
. other precept of the Constitution* tense pre­
cepts were not written into tee document to en­
able those tec * invoking their literal meaning* 
would destroy the whole of which they were part. 
Because he .had been elected by all tee people, 
he must, even without tee consent of Congress 
or Court, do teat was necessary.29
Xn the years following Lincoln, tee presidential 
role ted tee various concepts governing teat position re­
volved mainly around tee controversy of legislative suprem­
acy versus executive autonomy* Legislative power became 
the dominant element on tee American political scene and
^Corwin, on.elt«. pp* 310-311* 
28fugwell, cm«..clt«f p. 160.
^fugwcil, pjuaLt.j p. 157*
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313
remained so until the arrival of Theodore Roosevelt in the
White House*
Roosevelt was a staunch supporter of shat became 
known as the stewardship theory of the presidency. Ac­
cording to this concept, the President nay take any action 
in the interest of the nation which is sot forbidden by 
the lavs or the Constitution* Roosevelt a&de the pres­
idency "the ©entre of the American political system***^
1 am inclined to adopt the view that what was 
imperatively necessary for the Ration could 
not be 4mm by the President unless he could 
find some specific authorization to do it* My 
belief was that it was not only his right but 
his duty to do anything that the needs of the 
Ration demanded unless such action was forbidden 
by the Constitution or by the lav* X did not 
usurp powers, but X J&d greatly broaden the use 
of Executive power*31
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt expressed the
same general view along stronger lines* He statedt
I cannot tell what powers may have to be exer­
cised In order 'to win this war* The American 
people can be sure that X will use my powers 
with a full sense of ay responsibility to the 
Constitution and to ay country* The American 
people can also be sure that X shall not hesi­
tate to use every power vested in me to ac­
complish the def eat of cur enemies in any part 
of the world where our own safety demands such 
defeat* When the war Is wen, the powers under 
which X act automatically revert to the people - 
to whoa they b e l o n g #3*
Franklin P* Roosevelt*s theory of the presidency 
was made manifest in the executive initiative taken with
3%emmilte© on Government Operations, op.cit*. p* Xb*
% M d . ,  *. 15.
3%o*alttm on OovaiUMnt Operation*, on.alt., p. 1$.
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1**
the introduction of the lev ©eel end later in his direction 
of the American war effort# the President and his office 
became the focal point of American political thought and 
action* this sane concept of a strong Chief Incentive 
carried over into the Kennedy view of the presidency*
She varying view of the American Presidency point 
to the development of that office, its powers and its func­
tions as a variable, dependent on. the personality of the nan 
in office, on the crises with which he mist cope, on the 
attitude of the Congress toward the Chief Executive, and on 
the influence exerted by previous Presidents#^
The concept of presidential power had changed
Of
to national crises# AS John F# Kennedy 
prepared himself for the presidency he became more convinced 
that strong leadership would be necessary to meet the chal­
lenge of the I960*s. he tools: his cue from the iniatlves of
the most forceful presidents in American history*
^%he importance of the attitude of the Congress toward 
th® President is clearly shown in a comparison of the legisla­
tive aspirations of Kennedy and the legislative accomplish­
ments of Johnson ««s their rcaneebAw# relations with fionmress# 
"Kennedy made demands) Johnson makes promises* Circumstances 
that he quickly seised, together with his own approach, gave 
Johnson, a chance to create a different atmosphere* Sis lead- 
ershls mar not seem so bold or dcuBdlsK or inssirine as 
Kennedy|: s but it has persuaded some men to do what they ought 
to do without persuasion** Wicker, os*.elt«T editorial page*
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E n E * l  CCMCBFf OF THE PRISIBBHCY 
g m  ASB0MXM THAT OFFICE
Ijffmt#1 a, jSeyfeJjalUgR
Kennedy, as a student, as an athlete, as the sob 
of the Ambassador to the Court. of St.. Jams* and as the 
grandson of not on® hat. two political legends, was in* 
financed In his reasoning and in his persistent drive to 
reach .the top In American politics by the circumstances 
of his descant and by the precedents set,, over the years, 
by his predecessors, Kennedy ms also influenced la the 
development of his ova individual concept of the presiden­
cy by his years on Capitol Bill as both a Representative 
and a Senator, and as a potential vice-presidential candi­
date in 1956.
the widely publicised history of the Kennedy family 
has aroused admiration in some quarters and censure in others. 
It was this background. however, that made John F« Kennedy 
the competitor he proved to be, and drove him to search for 
the answers to any number of problems whose solutions he 
sought in the office of the president.
faking the Kennedy family as a whole, It might be 
eelS that family unity and strength revolved around poli­
ties.
15
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Bom of a political family, la one of the most 
political of cities. Kennedy ... is very much 
the product of political combat*_kTo him9 poli­
ties Is the art of the possible#^
Survival within the Kennedy Clan is dependent on
the rough-md-tumbl® give and. take characteristic of any
number of large American families, and yet, the Kennedy
Clan, was unique in many respects*
Everybody who knows the Kennedys talks about 
the fierceness of the deep competitive drive 
that the father has instilled In the sons*
& close friend of the family says, “Iteether 
it's a subcommittee hearing or a game of touch 
football at the Washington Monument* they*re 
out for blood*11 k l&shlngtoii reporter sums 
up the Kennedy1# with a line from a pep talk 
that he overheard Bob giving to one of hi« 
seven small children. “Let’s swing higher and 
try for a new record* k Kennedy shouldn’t be 
scared**!?
This competitive drive was not limited to the 
field of athletics or physical ability, but extended into 
all fields of activity* The Kennedy# were made constantly 
aware of affairs in the world of politics and were expected 
to keep abreast of events as they occurred, forming their 
own reasoned opinion of the significance of those events.^
Joseph P* Kennedy, Jr. was being groomed for the 
presidency* “The ambition for the presidency in the Kennedy 
household was bom with Joe Jr* History cut Joe Jr.*a 
career shortj his kid brother, his closest rival, his closest
# * j f e j y ? A  B a m s ,  k f a l k t e w l  i m i U M
Clew York, I960), pp. ix,kii*
35Joe McCarthy, U p  Msm&m,* (Hew fork,
I960), p. 23*
% e n ®  Schoor, (Hew ?ork, 1963)
P. 20.
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friend took up that ambition.”3?
Simile still, a student, planning to go to Prince-
ton University, Kennedy was asked by M s  father, “What
would you do if you were President of the United. States?”
Ufa answer wag* ”I*a not sure, I don't know enough to
answer that*”^  The ipestioa asked referred to the im-
fending threat of Hitler and M s  one*thousand-year Reich.
She reference itself was specific, and yet the answer given
could he applied to any area of politics with which the
president sight he concerned. John Kennedy was thorough
in his academic research and the competitive drive instilled
in him by his father drove him to get all the facts, to
know ail the circumstances before any generalization
or any decision.
like a good poker-player, a master broker 
(Kennedy) must he cool-headed and clear- 
minded, utterly realistic about his own hand 
awit that of M «  oooonents • unflust ered end 
unwiHing to he hurried ... He has dealt so 
long with intractable problems that he resists^ 
sweeping judgments a*jd doctrinaire solutions *
It might therefore he Said that John Fitzgerald Kennedy's
familr fa. ftircrpfwmri - the political inheritance of his aaces-
try, *w<!* t^e competitive spirit ««<*>»% M s  immediate family
led him to view the presidency as the goal toward which
he had to canal his ambitions, the presidency represented
a political battle to be won. the stakes were high, hut
37iM£.* P* 22.
3%ehoor, op.clt. f p. b9.
^Bums, op.clt.. p. Ml.
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tli® position was there for the taking f and who could fill 
that position hotter than a Kennedy?
  ft i«LteX
the concept each individual holds of the President 
and of his functions, duties and powers varies, to a cer­
tain extent,, with his vantage point* To the voter, the 
presidency is the highest.office in the land* If legis­
lation fails to become lav It is the responsibility of 
the Chief Legislator, the President* To the serviceman, 
the President is his Commander-In-Chief, and military 
allocations and benefits are made available through his 
efforts* To the Representative and to the Senator,, legis­
lators in their .own right, the President is both friend and 
foe* The degree to which the President is able to exercise 
his powers is dependent on the degree to which he is able 
to control the Legislative Rouses*
The men who share in governing this country 
frequently appear.to act as though they were 
in business for themselves. There is no 
reason to suppose that **« men of large but 
differing responsibilities will see all things 
through the same glasses* On the contrary* It 
is to be expected that their views ••• will
vary with the differing, perspectives 
particular responsibilities evoke.*10 
The position held by John F* Kennedy during his 
terms as Representative and Senator differed somewhat from 
the concept he held as President* His view differed not 
in regard to what the office was, but in regard to the
1%iehard R. Heustadt, B m >. HRU.U&R
of. L e a d e rs * !jp , (jfew fork, lyol), pp.
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manner in which the power# of that office were to be im­
plemented. In setting out to reach his objective in the 
political field, Kennedy held to the belief that “they
kl
don’t giwe prises for being second best*'* * the motiva­
tion driving him to his political goal can be explained 
rather simply. He wanted to be in the front line of 
battle. At the outset of his first congressional campaign 
in 19**6 he saidt
It is interesting enough watching. There*s 
some sense of gratification writing about the 
big men, about all this manoeuvring. It’s a 
lot more lnteresfAnte iminar «*rt of the same*
some aanoouvrlmt on roar own. It’s ltitft 
the difference between watching a football game 
from the fifty yard ..line and naming a football 
down the field with the good blocking in front 
of y0u**2
Kennedy was camtioaed by his father that "yon don*t 
play m  the Varsity the test time you get into scrimmage.” 
Kennedy’s answer was to set the guideline along which his 
political career was to proceed. “This is me game in which 
I am going to get my letter."1^
She general attitude of members of the Legislature 
cannot be termed one of indifference | it is an attitude that 
calls for a -Jockeying for position* “the struggle between 
the executive and the legislative is endless. The President 
will master Congress if he can.} the Congress will make the
**%eh®0Fv op.clt.. p. 161.
». 156.
^ibld.. p. 157.
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President its servant, if it can.1*1*^  And yet, while this 
attitude continues to prevail, members of Congress often 
hold to the view that the Administration's proposed policies 
will succeed If the nation is given strong, creative leader­
ship by its president* Kennedy was not one to dismiss the 
importance of a strong executive and he was moved hy the 
TJ-2 incident and the subsequent collapse of the Bisenhower- 
Khrushchev summit meeting to write i
Hay 17, I960, marked the end of an era —  an 
era of Illusion —  the illusion that platitudes 
and slogans are a substitute for strength and 
planning —  the illusion that personal good will 
is a substitute for hard, carefully prepared 
bargaining on concrete Issues —  the illusion 
that good intentions and pious principles are. 
a substitute for strong, creative leadership.**?
The creative leadership emphasized by Kennedy was
not considered the sole possession of the Chief Executive.
This leadership was considered desirable in any political
representative, fils stand on this issue was made quite
clear. He did not advocate a specific line of action or
recommend any way in which this quality of leadership might
be realized by the leaders In the government, but he did
state the necessity for political courage, action, and
leadership on the part of any elected official.
Today the ohallo&ge of politloal courage looms 
larger than ever before. Our political life is 
becoming so expensive, so mechanized, and so 
dominated by professional politicians and public 
relations men that the idealist who dreams of
^afiossitt, QP.clt.. p. 21.
^John F. Kennedy, fork,
1961), p.v.
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independent statesmans!lip Is rudely awaked by 
the necessity ©f elections and accomplishment.
Only the very ©curagecus will be able to take 
the hard and unpopular decisions necessary for 
®ar survival la l b  struggle with a powerful 
©near «**■ an enemy with leaders who need give 
little thought t© the popularity of their course, 
who need pay little tribute to the public opinion 
they theaseAves manipulate, and who may force, 
without fear of retaliation at the polls, their 
citizens to sacrifice present laughter for future
ery. And only the very courageous will be able keep alive the spirit of individualism and dissent which gave birth to this nation, nourished 
it as an infant and .carried it through, its severest 
tests upon the attainment of maturity.**®
Kennedy1 s concept of the presidency during his 
years as a representative from the state of Massachusetts, 
held firmly to the view that the presidency Itself was an 
office second to none, that the accomplishments of the 
president were dependent on his ability to mold rather 
than control Congress, and to see clearly the issues of 
greatest importance to the nation as a whole. As John F. 
Kennedy rose through the political hierarchy of the United 
States Government, his concept changed, but not radically. 
As a member of the' national legislature, it was Kennedy's 
political obligation to see that the interests of the 
people he represented were not ignored, and to see that the 
policies advocated by the Administration were not encroach- 
Jjtg on the interests of m s  constituents or on the inter­
ests of the nation as a whole. His position was one of 
a check m  the executive. As a result of the "checking" 
feature of his position, it was Kennedy#s responsibility
^John f * Kennedy, tefitoI, <®ew fork,
196b}, p. 16*
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to investigate, analyze, and distinguish between those 
executive actions taken for the good of the natlont and 
those actions taken for the future advantage of the Ad* 
ministration* Because of the President’s position in the 
government, the failure of specific policies advocated by 
the Administration rested squarely with the Chief Bxeeu* 
live* the President’s moves were to be questioned, and 
advocated only after the Chief ixecmtive had proved their 
worth. A strong leader could accomplish this, the House 
of Representatives and the M a t e  were the chief safe* 
guards against executive control of the government, but 
the President should be able to prove to the nation that 
the national interest would be -Served by his policies, 
this attitude too was to change as Kennedy shifted from 
the legislative' branch to the executive.
"I used to wonder when I was a member of the House 
how President fruman got in so much trouble. How 2 am be* 
.ginning to get the idea* It is not difficult*"^
AJfaBtttofrr*!! tefiil 
John P. Kennedy sought the presidency because that 
office provided the means through which he might participate 
In the front line of the world’s p o l i t ie s !  b a t t le  even
was ’’the
most heavily burdened officer .in the world*”^  As he stated
l a i Z f s s & g z i & g M s w a ?  { W 1* *  ~
1*8John F. Kennedy, Legacy of a President,(Vfetahlmrton)» 
IM3.f 196**), p. fl.
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in one pre-election speech*
1 do not run fur the office under any expecta** 
tion that it is an easy, honorary ion. I run 
because the power and responsibility which the 
' force of events hare thrust upon the President 
sake this the wailspring of American action.
4 Senator*s voice is important# 4s a Senator 
1 speak for Massachusetts* the President speaks 
not only for the Baited States but for all who 
desire to be free, .and who are willing to bear 
the burdens of freedom#1*?
Some months prior to the Democratic National Con­
vention, Kennedy expressed his concept of the Presidency.
At this stage he had still to gain primary victories in 
Wisconsin and West Virginia. In formulating this view 
Kennedy actually set down the .guidelines along which he 
was expected to develop the offiee to its fullest poten­
tial.
Today a restricted concept of the Presidency is 
not enough, for underneath today*s surface gloss 
of peace and prosperity are increasingly danger­
ous. unsolved, long-postponed problems —  problems 
that wiH inevitably explode to the surface during
-*--- - —  Mk ml  m l  Sl ^ S m m C h  .ft. 4A*#MikM. 'At Mt —the next four years of the next Administration —  
the growing missile gap. the rise of Communist 
China., the despair of M e  underdeveloped nations, 
the explosive situations in Berlin and in the 
Formosa Strait, the deterioration of NATO, the 
lack of an arms control agreement, and el* the 
domestic problems of ourfarma, cities, and 
schools .50
The promises made in the heat of the presidential 
campaign and the platforms approved at the National Conven­
tions supposedly add to the Image the candidate wishes to
1*9lSi4„ p, 91,
50I.H. Whit., T m f M t t T i ,  1960% Saturday Rwlaw. 
March 2d, I960, p. 16.
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place before the American electorste. This "image”, of tea 
distorted hr the circumstances of the campaign, the heat 
of the battle, and the Issues involved, is held up, for 
comparison, to the actual action of the m m  after he has 
been elected to office* The President’s biggest probleat 
has been attributed to the acquisition and maintenance of 
support for his program.^3* To achieve this program, the 
fre.si.dent is forced to rely, to some degree, on the inage 
he has projected to the public, on the "image*’ that was 
elected to that office* 4s a result, the President acids 
and alters the presidential office to fit his inage, and 
to follow, as far as is possible given the present situa­
tion, the precedents and prerogatives established by his 
predecessors.
4 striking feature of our recent past has been 
the transformation into routine practice of 
the actions we once treated as exceptional ... 
a*mI what fan* es caned statutorv reeoaaitioa 
mostly been accreted into presidential common 
law, confirmed Into custom, no less binding}
4 .W .A . ' v  40M I J t a . *fcb> »> i  S m nfc, „a  4 .1a* W  U M U iiiJ i n  m*  «* —  n .w . *h m%U* npwlvi® Ou&w 0OBTW®l6i |
for example, or the personally presented leg*
d t ^1* »  rife i r  M i M ill ^1 lA a l t & M  -*• t !  II*  1. l— rlr t *1 <S «*h 4* *  'tig M tlaxative program, or .personal, campaigning in 
congressional elections.52
Kennedy’s concept of the presidency was exception­
ally vivid during the campaign of I960. This view was the 
result of the political experience gained in the House of 
Representatives and in the Senate, as well as the result 
of .political expediency.
?2Neustadt, QB.elt.f pp. 5*6.
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The Platform approved toy the Democratic National
Convention of I960 was entitled "The .Bights of Has'1* The
first article of the platform states, In part, that!
It Is our continuing responsibility to provide 
.am effective instrument of political action 
for every American who seeks to strengthen these 
rights —  everywhere in America, and everywhere 
in our 20th century world*
It was the object of this platform to place toe* 
fore the American electorate the problems and issues con­
sidered most important in the campaign of I960. The pro­
posals ranged from the areas of national defense to those 
of civil rights. John P. Kennedy’s presidential campaign 
was waged along these same lines* His nomination accept­
ance speech in July* I960 called for a lew frontier. The 
fact that Kennedy felt the presidency faced a new and 
critical struggle in the 1960’s was borne out in this same 
speech.
The times are too grave, the ehaHemge too 
urgent* end the stakes too high —  to permit 
the customary passions of political debate. We 
ate not here to curse the darkness, tout to light 
the candle that guide us through that dark­
ness to a safe and sms future. As Winston 
Churchill said on taking office some 20 years 
ago | if we open a quarrel between the present 
and the past, we shall toe in danger of losing 
the future* today our concern must be with 
that future* for the world is changing* The*, 
old era is ending. The old ways will not do.?J
Kennedy called for action, on the part of Congress 
Bjohn F* Kennedy, Ihf.,,!&% I&aiAlSKi (i&shlngton, B.C.,
I960), , . X  i20926
UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR LIBRARY
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and on the part of the electorate itself*. He went directly
to the public with a set of proposals, not a set of promises
The Hew frontier of which I speak is not a set 
of promises —  it is a set of challenges. It 
snas up not what 1 intend to offer the American 
people, but what 1 intend to ask of theaur*
The bemoeratle candidate and the platform on whieh 
he ran placed emphasis on the responsibilities facing the 
nation as a whole, and on the need for a president who 
could not only recognise those responsibilities but was 
prepared to sacrifice what was necessary for the attainment 
of those goals* Kennedy’s concept of the presidency was 
one enveloping the growth of that office in the areas of 
world prestige, world respesisibilityf and national welfare* 
His concept was broad, as was his proposed program of action* 
A dynamic president was considered necessary and the earn* 
salam trail was to provide the ■»**»* of erodes tins the inane 
of a dynamic Kennedy to the American electorate*
Xt&.Im&LmUl C^ fflpalKR, 1W
The Bemoerattc national Convention provided the 
initial impetus for the presidential campaign* The cam­
paign Itself provided the setting for the presentation of 
Kennedy and his views to the public.
The theme of this campaign is going to be action, 
action here at home to keep peace with the grow­
ing needs of an standing country, and action 
abroad to meet the challenge of our adversaries*
2 believe the American people elect a President 
to act* He is the only one-who can speak for
p . «.
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the people of the Halted States*55
Oa a amber of occasions Kennedy was asked to 
list the qualifications he considered necessary for the 
Presidency* At other times he vas asked to give his view 
of the office aad the responsibilities encompassed la that 
positioa* His answers to both sets of questions give a 
general outline of the office as a candidate might see it.
As la all election campaigns9 the candidates talk Hissu©#M 
and tend to steer the campaign talk to the .successes or 
failures of the party presently holding office* In pre­
senting himself to the publicf Senator John F. Kennedy 
talked “issues1* t expressed his opinion on Quemoy and Matsu, 
Cuba, and federal intervention In labour-management dis­
putes, and stated rather forcefully the duties of the 
presidency as he saw lt9. as well as the qualifications 
needed by an American leader of the Sixties*
Chi September 29, I960, Senator Kennedy was asked, 
"What do you think are the qualities In a President which 
m^afce a great President?** He answered:
Well, X think, of course, great times make 
Presidents and great men* that is a factor.
Washington, llneoln, Wilson, Roosevelt —  X 
think that they lived in times of crises and 
met the crises* In addition X would say vital­
ity. Tfaoodore Roosevelt had thatf so did 
Jefferson, a sense of the future and the past 
and a wl.de cultural experience which makes it 
possible for them to draw on the lives of other 
men and the experiences of other men *»<* apply 
it to a particular situation, moral courage, a
iqfiQ ^ohn^F^ennad^Rie^rd^M.^ Mixon^||levl8i^n Debates—
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sens© of the future, a sense of the met, a 
physical vitality, intellectual vitality, 
intellectual curiosity and purpose.?®
in the following'day, September 30, Kennedy stated
that,
The President is really the center of doverm- 
ment, of opinion. He molds it. that is the 
function of the President, The President is 
the only one who speaks for all the people, 
and ... on a great issue, he should speak to 
the people.57
On Movember 5* 19&0, three days before the American 
public was to go to the polls, both candidates, Richard M. 
Hlxon and John f # Kennedy, provided statements outlining 
their individual view of the Presidency*
Vice-President Mixon held that greatness in a 
President was not the result of that individual1* ambi­
tion.* *1 President will he great, only to the extent that 
he represents tod articulates the Ideals —  the highest 
ideals —  of the people of the nation." Mixon held that 
the ideals of the American people wild determine the degree 
of greatness achieved by the President, regardless of his 
individual ambition, but dependent on his ability to mold 
and represent the Ideals of the nation.
itoator Kennedy viewed the President and the pres­
idency as an individual in. a singular situation, his a c tio n s
^•mwdy, Hina, Iri.wl.lon Debit... p. 111.
j>« us.
% ! - .  P. 377.
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and his success being dependent m  bis Interpretation of 
the Constitution and on bis ability to act whan and where 
he cleaned action necessary.
>.The powers given to the President of the 
United ftates by the Constitution are numer­
ous. and' In many ways* the powers are flexible*
They leave it to the nan. They leave it to his 
own good judgment* m m  Presidents have been 
native* n*3ehftw«» and Lincoln cap* within me- 
seeding years. Buchanan did nothing and let 
the eouatry drift toward the war of 1861 f Lincoln 
did everything «-*» Theodore Eoosevelt, Woodrow 
Wilson, Franklin Boosevelt, Harry Truman —  all 
saw the Presidency as a strong* powerful voice 
of the United Stales* Only the President speaks 
for the American people ... In a free society he 
is the center of action# Only the President of 
the United States can. Mace before the American 
people the unfinished business of our society, 
can serve to direct them toward the goal of 
great national purpose, can rally their forces 
and energy inly the President of the United 
States, in a very real sense, can place before 
us the public .interest, can rally the people 
of the united States to compete successfully, 
which 1 believe we can do, against our adver­
saries • «« The President must be for the people#
He must sound the chord that is in all of us, 
of devotion to our eountry, and 1 believe, in 
the 1960*®, the President of the United States 
must rally the people, must move then forward, 
ansi move our country, must place before the 
people our unfinished business* X 
believe the Presidency can be the greatest 
possible Importance —  and is really the reason 
X run for the Presidency. after 1** years in Con-
rss —  can. be the .greatest possible importance the great struggle for freedom which takes place here and all around the world. And for 
freedom to be successful reauires a strong, 
progressive, and vital America. That*® the 
Kind of America that the neat President of the 
United States must set before the world.59
Senator John F. Kennedy, in the closing days of 
the campaign and well into his term of office, saw the
Kennedy, Hixoa, PP* 377-378*
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presidency as the centre of activity* activity in both
domestic and international fields* The President was the
individual upon whom responsibility was to lie*
the American Presidency will demand more than 
ringing manifestos issued from the rear of 
battle* It wiH demand that the President 
will place himself in the very thick of the 
fight* that he care passionately about the 
fate of the people he leadc, that he be will­
ing to serve them at the risk of incurring 
their momentary displeasure*®0
The views expressed during a political campaign 
are oftentimes regarded as merely fee manifestation of 
political expediency. The proof of campaign pronounce­
ments lies in the actualization, once the victor has ac­
cepted the decision, of the electorate* What may seem 
clear-cut one day* la a specific instance, takes on an 
entirely new light* given new circumstances and new re­
sponsibilities. Senator Kennedy* in the days before his 
election as President, stated that the Chief Executive 
must be willing to serve the American public to the best 
of his ability and to act as he sees fit regardless of the 
political advantage or disadvantage to himself. In the 
first days after his election* Kennedy proceeded to select 
the men he considered most qualified to flH Cabinet posi­
tions* In selecting his Cabinet Kennedy was faced with a 
situation that called not for a retraction of a campaign 
statement but for a realization of the leadership and de­
cisive action he deemed necessary in the President of the
^Kennedy* Nikon, television Pebates* p* 603.
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Sixties*
te September 19* I960, Senator Kennedy m s  asked if 
be would feel any restriction in naming a member of his im­
mediate family to the Cabinet* Kennedy stated then that 
such a more would probably be unwise but that he did hop® 
his brothers would be able to contribute their services to 
the new Administration* He also stated, however,, that Mwe 
are going to need all the people of dedication we can get**61 
Little over a month later, on October 21, I960, Kennedy 
stated that "I am asking the people's support as Presidentj 
we will select the best men we can get#*62 The Senator from 
Massachusetts had stated throughout his campaign that “all 
appointments, both high and low, will be made on the basis 
of ability —  without regard to race, creed, national origin, 
sex, section or o c c u p a t i o n * ” ^
In December, i960, President-elect Kennedy nominated 
his brother, Robert F* Kennedy, as Attorney General of the 
United States* On January 21, 1961, Robert Kennedy was 
sworn.in as lead of the Department of Justice*
The appointment of his brother as Attorney General 
resulted in a deluge of critical comments, commentaries, and 
editorials* President-elect Kennedy, In answering the crit­
icism leveled at one of his first decisions, and in standing
^Kennedy, Nixon, P* 5^ .
% M . d *t p. 267*
6%obert E* Thompson, Hortense Myers,Jtato&J*Jbwatat 
I M l i  C»ew fork, 1962), p. 16*
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by bit decision, enacted what be considered to be the most 
important demand placed before the President of the Sixties - 
that he he willing to serfs the American people at the risk 
of incurring even their momentary displeasure.
Kennedy had stated that the new Administration 
needed aen of competence, dedication, ability, they had to 
be 1die best men they could get. Of his brother he said, 
"lobby*s easily the best man l*ve ever m m  ... 1*11 take 
his word over anybody1
As President, Kennedy faced. In the 1960*s chal­
lenges and demands that had to be met with instantaneous 
and correct answers. Mistakes were made, but the blame, 
whether deserved or not, rested squarely with the President. 
Kennedy met these challenges head-on. He incurred criti­
cism and displeasure, but he acted from the front line, with 
the sole purpose of serving the American people he repre­
sented. The record of his years in the Presidency bears 
tMs out —  on both the domestic .and the international 
scene, He lived the Presidency as he saw that office.
I shall devote every effort of mind and spirit 
to fulfilling the oath of the Presidency —  
practically Identical, X might add, with the 
oath I have taken for fourteen years in the 
Congress. For, without reservation, X can, 
and I quote, "solemnly swear that I will faith­
fully execute the office of .president of the 
Halted States and will to the best of my ability 
preserve, protecj^asd defend the Constitution,
HortenseMyers, m m , M  KPOftato
& f  irtlbfi; Withla» Cirew fork, isda), p. 225*
I960 6flaw°lork Hi 9 ^ t0p p ^ l ^ » H g...... .............
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THE PBSSIDEHCYi THE M k m  XM OFFICE
Kennedy found soon after he assumed the presidency 
that the office presented a different picture to the in­
cumbent than it did to even the most informed outsiders* 
Circumstances, and problems arising in both the domestic 
and foreign fields called for a solution and a decision on
the part of the President* the solution could be offered
by any number of advisors, but the decision rests with one 
man, the President* Mo amount of political know-how, po­
litical savvy, or specialised .education can compensate for 
lack of experience in the office of the President* He 
alone is President, and he alone bears the burden of re­
sponsibility*
The American Presidency is a formidable, exposed, 
and somewhat mysterious institution* It is 
formidable because it represents the point of 
ultimate decision in the American political 
system. It is exposed because decision cannot 
take place in a vacuum; the .Presidency is the
canter of the play of pressure, interest, and
idea in the Mation A wise President ••• 
gathers strength and insight from the Mation*
Still, in the end, he is alone* There stands 
th e  d e c is io n  —  end th e re  stands th e  P re s id e n t*
"I have accustomed myself to receive with re­
spect the opinions of others,* said Andrew 
Jackson* *but always take the responsibility 
of deciding for myself*"®®
1963, (Washington, D.C., 196*+), p.370, September 23, 19*3-
33
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Kennedy realized that "there is no experience yon 
can get that can possibly prepare yon adequately for the 
Presidency."67 He gained his experience in office. The 
decisions he aade were his* and his alone. Kennedy had 
the benefit of knowledgeable advisors, but even this did 
not prevent an unwise decision from being aade. The Kennedy 
Administration aade advances in the domestic field, par­
ticularly in the area of civil rights.
On the other hand, he was the recipient of criti­
cism for his handling of the steel crisis in 1962. The 
Federal government had intruded into an area supposedly 
confined to labor and to management. The international 
sphere seemed to dominate Kennedy's interest during his 
term of office. What advances did he make here? How did 
the actions of President Kennedy, in both domestic and 
international affairs, compare with the duties, and re­
sponsibilities of the President, as seen by that same man?
fflm J m b i
Xn spite of the fact that actual Civil lights 
Legislation was not formally passed until after his death, 
John F. Kennedy has been acknowledged as a leader in the 
fight for elvil right*. He considered the l**ue of olvil 
rights to be a moral issue, not merely a legal one.
This is not a legal or legislative issue alone ...
We are confronted primarily with a moral Issue.
■Til181 -.r-JL262> P* 551# ©ecember 17, 1962.
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It is at old as the Scriptures and Is as clear 
as the American Constitution* The heart of 
the question is whether all Americans are to 
he afforded equal rights .and equal opportunities, 
whether we are going to treat our fellow Amer­
icans as we want to he treated This nation, 
for all.its hopes and all its boasts will not 
he fully free until all its citizens are free 
We face therefore, a moral crisis as a country 
and as a people* It cannot he met hy repres­
sive police action* It cannot he left to in­
creased demonstrations in the streets* It 
cannot he quieted hy token mores ... It is a 
time to act in the Congress, in your state and 
local legislative body, and above all, in all of 
our daily lives.©*5
How did Kennedy*s classification of civil rights, as a 
moral issue, enter Into Presidential responsibility?
Kennedy held that the President nrust he a moral leader.
It is his responsibility, as President,, to "set the moral 
imperative**^ Kennedy’s federalizing of troops in June, 
1963, was considered necessary to carry out an order of 
the United States District Court of the Wortham District 
of Alabama* The use of the Alabama National Guard brought 
hack memories of the use of federal troops in Arkansas in 
195^* Where did the difference lief
During the presidential campaign of I960, Kennedy 
stated that president Eisenhower should have commented on 
the Supreme Court Decision of 195** regarding the segrega­
t io n  of s c h o o l** Ho f a i t  th o  P re s id e n t, as one who speaks 
for a H  the people, should speak to the people*
68Harry Golden.  t M  Ifiarftgg» (Greenwich,
Conn*, 196%), pp.213-215*
6%elevi,ilm Ite&it.ej, i960, p. 152.
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The implementation of the Court decision is 
within the Court1* Judgment. They are the 
ones who here said hy whet speed end what 
manners the Court decision would he carried 
out* But 1 think that the President should, 
in the future | indicate his belief that we 
should work and strife toward equality of 
opportunity for American*#'0
Kennedy carried out this thought in confronting 
the American public with the events in Alabama on June 
11, 1963. He called then for specific Civil lights leg­
islation in the areas of employment, and of public educa­
tion# He reversed what he considered a lapse on the part 
of President Eisenhower and went directly to the nation, 
to express his conviction and to propose action on the 
issue at hand* The use of federalized troops was consid­
ered necessary in this instance but only after the facts 
.surrounding 'the basic issued of equality and civil rights 
were made clear to the American public*
Kennedy was faced with several alternatives* He 
could have left the Implementation of the court decision 
up to the officials of the state or he could have feder­
alized the militia and taken action himself* He chose the 
second alternative because of the Issues involved and be­
cause of his position as moral leader of the nation. Had 
he left th e  Implementation of th e  court decision to th e  
officials of the state there is little doubt that the de­
cision would be ignored* The decision ms, in fact, opposed
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by the state executive and implementation would have been 
virtually impossible*
The steel crisis in 1962 paralleled a situation, 
Involving the steel industry, handled by Vice-president 
Nixon. Again, during the presidential campaign of I960, 
Senator Kennedy was questioned as to M s  evaluation of 
the steel strike settled by Vice-president Nixon. Kennedy 
stated that he considered federal intervention necessary 
but that the aetioa taken by the Vice-president should 
have been taken sooner. He stressed the fact that he felt 
the influence and power position of tee President should 
have been and could have been used more effectively at an 
earlier date, with the result being an earlier settlement*
Be did state that, "There is a place for federal interven­
tion, parti^Marly in national emergency strikes.**71
te April, 1962, a settlement had been reached 
between tee steel union and tee management* At tee same 
time, steel management announced an increase in steel price* 
President Kennedy, at a national press conference on April 
11, 1962, denounced tee price increase on tee grounds that 
it was unjustified. Kennedy defended his intervention into 
this matter, which would usually have been considered beyond 
the scope of federal interference in a free enterprise econ­
omy,in tee following manner«
Price and wage decisions in this country, 
exceptfor a very limited restriction in
p* iaa*
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the case of monopolies and national emergency 
strikes, are and ought to ho freely and pri­
vately oado* But the American people have a 
right to expect, in return for that freedom, 
a higher sens® of business responsibility 
for the welfare of their country than haa
been shown."2
At the sane tine, a labor dispute involving the 
West Coast sarltine industry posed a threat to national 
health and safety. In slalng up the'situation on the 
West Coast, President Kennedy issued an executive order 
establishing a board of inquiry to investigate the issues 
involved* Federal intervention was deemed necessary and 
action was taken.
In two instances then John P. Kennedy, as Presi­
dent, entered into a labor dispute ..and .into a dispute over 
price increases. The action taken in both oases was con­
sidered necessary to preserve the national welfare. The 
President had acted to serve the people of the nation,
“even with the risk of incurring their momentary displeasure•"
The s o w
She American President is many men to many people.
The sphere with which he primarily concerns himself wiH 
often determine the direction to which public interest 
will tu r n . In the <s«»e o f  P re s id e n t Kennedy, th e  in t e r ­
national sphere of politics presented the biggest problems 
facing his Administration. At the end of the presidential
72flg,f8MimUftl,Mmm», —  A2&U p. 317, April 11, 1962.
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campaign* Kennedy stated tee qualifications be considered
necessary in an American President of tee i960* s. He also
stated tee position teat should toe held toy tee President*
Pennsylvania Avenue is no longer a local Wash­
ington thoroughfare. It runs through Paris 
and London* Ankara and Teheran* Hew Delhi and
Tokyo. And if Washington Is tee capital of tee 
free world, tee President must toe its leaderj 
our Constitution requires it, oar history re­
quires it* oar survival, requires it *73
tee isolationism of the 1920*8 and 1930*s was considered 
a closed chapter in American history, tee American polit­
ical arena focused its attention on tee international sit­
uation* with particular regard, to national security, and 
international .freedom.
, tee.se are extraordinary times* And we face 
an extraordinary challenge. Our strength as 
well as our convictions have imposed upon this 
nation tee role of leader in freedom*s cause.
Ho role in history could toe more difficult or 
more important. That Is our conviction for 
ourselvest that is our only commitment to 
others* Ho friend, no adversary should think 
otherwise* We are not against any man* or any 
nation, or any system* except as it is hostile 
to freedom »•* And while no nation has ever 
faced, such a challenge, no nation has ever been 
so ready to seise tee burden and the glory of 
freedom*?1*
The Kennedy Administration faced a number of 
crises in the international steers of politics during its 
firet few years, tee first such encounter with
f • 603*
1<afel Kennedy* .
9 JOhn P. Kennedy* 9|hf. (New
fork* 196**), p* 20.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Coobm]itst forces culminated fa the abortive Bay of figs 
Invasion in April, 1961. la Angust, 1961, a wall was 
erected la East Seraany, separating last and West Berlin, 
la October, 1962, Cuba again took over the political spot­
light as President Kennedy called for a quarantine of the 
island. In Inly, 1963, a nuclear test baa treaty was ne­
gotiated* The treaty was signed In October, 1963* Not 
all International ©rises were successes* The Bay of Pigs 
invasion m s  an unqualified failure that could have cat­
apulted the world into a large-scale nuclear war* The 
second Cuban crisis was a successful venture on the part 
of the United Itates, but that, too, could have thrust nu­
clear war on the nations of the world. The erection of 
the Berlin HSU presented a crisis in itself, but the im­
mediate deployment of troops to the area aade clear the 
Western intention to honour commitments. This situation 
could also have resulted in full-scale war. The signing 
of the nuclear test ban treaty on Oetober 25, 1963, less 
than a month before President Kennedy was assassinated, 
represented the culmination of years of attempts to nego­
tiate such an agreement. It was **an important first step —  
a step toward peace, a step toward reason, a step —  a 
step away from war."7?
The international scene was not quiet during the 
Kennedy years in the White House* Flare-ups occurred in
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the Congo, Laos, Vietnam, Cuba and Berlin* The last two
areas were of primary concern to Kennedy and to the nation* 
Cuba, a snail island ninety miles south of the 
Florida coastline, presented an unpleasant picture to the 
United States* Fidel Castro had taken over control of the 
island ln 1959* Since then Cuba had steadily acred toward 
an alltaace with luaala. In April, 1961, Cuban refugees 
launched an invasion of the island* The invasioaary force, 
backed by the Central Intelligence Agency of the United 
States, with m e  knowledge of the President and his advi­
sors, attempted to gain a foot-held in Cuba* The invasion 
attempt failed dlsasterously. Over 1,000 men were made 
prisoners of war*
Five days before the invasion attempt, President 
Kennedy had stated that “there will not be, under any con­
ditions, an intervention in Cuba by the United States Armed 
Forces.”?6 Shortly after the invasion, the American public 
and the rest of the world m s  informed of American complic­
ity in the action* The resulting failure of the invasion 
brought criticism from both sides* The rightists denounced 
the President for failing to provide the air-cover necessary 
to insure success* Others caressed concern that the Pres­
ident would accept such a plan*77 The President accepted
76FliaARliP.garf, .T.i.i261» p# 256, April 12, 1961.
77tfiUiam Manchester, Portrait of a President. (Hew 
York, 19©*0, p. lei.
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full responsibility for the decisions aade concerning the
notion and for its subsequent failure. His prims concern
steamed from the threat to American security and freedoat
and Ultimately to the security and freedom of the countries
of the world, not merely the countries presently composing
the free world.-*
Cuba is not an island unto Itself $ and our 
concern is not ended by mere expressions of 
nonintervention or regret ... It is clear that 
this Nation, in concert with all the free na­
tions of this hemisphere, must take an ever 
closer and more realistic lock at the menace 
of external Communist intervention and domi­
nation in Cuba* It is not primarily our 
interest or our security but theirs which is 
now, today, in the .greater peril.. It is for 
their sake as well, as our own that we must 
show cur will •*• We oust build a hemisphere 
where freedom can flourish | and where any free 
nation under outside attack of any kind can be 
assured that all of cur resources stand ready 
to respond to any request for assistance ... 
let me then make clear as the President of 
the Halted States that I am determined upon 
our system*s survival and success, regardless 
of the cost and regardless of the peril*/8
The lay of figs invasion is recorded as a Eaek 
mark, on the Kennedy record* Some measure of satisfaction 
can be derived from this failure, however, satisfaction 
that the public was presented with the facts, albeit after 
the invasion and its failure had been liberally publicised 
by the victorious Castro regime* the fact of the matter 
remains that the American public eventually received infor­
mation of the CIA complicity and advice, of the President's
April7^ ! ^ ! ^ 111 9* PP* 305-306,
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action on that advice, and of the Presidentvs full accept­
ance of responsibility for the entire action* The decision 
made mis the President*s alone and the responsibility 
rested with him* The buck stopped in the Oval Office of 
the White Bouse*
What alternative courses of action were open to 
Kennedy when he was confronted with the Bay of Pigs oper­
ation? Kennedy could have called the plan off, he could 
have supported the plan, placing some restrictive consid­
erations on it, or he could have further implemented the 
operation by providing full American military assistance, 
thus assuring the success of the venture*
If the plan had been stopped short of implementa­
tion, the 1HOO Cuban exile in training would have been 
turned loose to "spread the word that Kennedy had betrayed 
their attempt to depose C a s t r o *"<^ At the same time, it 
was also brought to Kennedy*s attention that if the planned 
Invasion was discarded, no similar attempt could be made 
in the future without specific American military assistance* 
The cause for alarm stemmed from the fact that the CIA ex­
pected a build up of arms to Cuba and an increase to the 
trained personnel necessary to build up CastE>*s forces* 
ftussian aid to toe Cuban dictator was felt inevitable in 
this respect*
?%* Sorenson, Kennedy, "Kennedy* s Worst Disaster", 
to Look* Vol* 29, No* Id, August 10, 1965, P* Mf.
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If Kennedy had accepted the alternative calling 
for full American military assistance, the invasion at­
tempt would likely have succeeded hut American participa­
tion in such a venture would have meant a full-fledged 
invasion hy the fnited States* Such action would have been 
contrary to American tradition and could have proven more 
harmful to the "cause of freedom throughout the hemisphere 
than even Castro*s continued presence.0 In addition, 
American forces were already below strength and if any of 
these forces had been engaged in guerilla warfare in Cuba,
the Communists could have then stepped-up moves in Berlin,
81or Laos or any other area of Contention* *
The third alternative given Kennedy, and the one 
with which he concurred, called for implementation of the 
invasion plan on the part of Cuban exiles. American mil­
itary assistance was not to he provided# The information 
made available to the President had assured him that Amer­
ican intervention was not considered essential to the suc­
cess of the operation# fhe momentum of the Cuban exile 
movement would have supposedly drawn a good deal of sup­
port from the Cuban masses and would have triggered a 
large-scale revolution on the island. As was evident in 
April, 1961, this information was vastly misleading.
8°Ibid.t p.
% M d . .  p. V h
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Kennedy accepted the information given bin by the 
"experts". fhn result was the Bay of Pigs disaster. He 
could have taken various other courses of action, but the 
on® course deemed feasible and consistent with U.S. non­
intervention policy was the alternative selected. The fact 
that the President was misinformed of the true situation 
did not alter his decision to accept responsibility for the 
fiasco.
"There*s an old saying that victory has a 
hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan ...
1 an the responsible officer of the Gov­
ernment, and that is quite obvious*”32
In August, 1961, the Berlin Mall %fias constructed.
West Berliners were cut off completely from Bast Berlin.
Bast Berliners were Isolated froa any contact with the free
world and her representatives. United States Armed Forces
had. been moved into the area previous to the action taken
by the last Berlin government# In July, 1961, Kennedy had
made mention of the crisis in Berlin, and made specific
reference to the Khrushchev aide memoirs to end the abnormal
division in Germany.
He (Khrushchev) .intends to bring to an end, 
through a stroke of the pen, first our legal 
rights to be in West Berlin —  and secondly 
our ability to make good on our commitment to 
the two million free people of that city, 
that we cannot permit* we are clear about 
what must be done —  and we intend to do It ••• 
we do not want to fight —  but we have fought 
before •«« WO must meet our oft-stated pledge 
to the free peoples of West Berlin —  and
82Sorenson, oo.cit#, p.50.
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maintain our rights and their safety, even in 
the face .of fore# —  in order to maintain the 
confidence of other free peoples in our word 
and enr resolve* the strength of the alliance 
on which our security depends is dependent in 
turn on our willingness to meet our- commitments 
to them ... We do not intend to abandon our 
. duty to mankind to seek a peaceful solution ...
We shall always be prepared to discuss inter­
national problems with any* and ail nations 
that are wSJ&lng to talk —  listen —  with 
reason* If they hare proposals—  not demands —  
we #foell hear them* If they seek genuine under­
standing —  not concessions of our rights —  we 
shall meet them **• We seek peace —  but we 
shall not surrender *■#* fhe freedom of,that 
city (West Berlin) is not negotiable.
In August, Kennedy was faced with the physical manifesta­
tion of that "abnormal” division* fhe United States com­
mitment in Berlin was made after the settlement of World 
tor II* That commitment is still being upheld today* The 
decision of the President of the Waited States to call into 
action the National Heserves, to strengthen the U.S. mili­
tary position in the divided city, and to protect American 
and tost German rights in the city, stands to strengthen 
the political position of the Waited States in Europe and 
to dispel any fears.that the United States, when faced with 
a threat to national security, will disregard the commit­
ments to eh# haniaii herself *
I am not here to present a new military doc­
trine, bearing any one name or aimed at any 
one area*®*! am here to promote the freedom 
doctrine
8%ybSytft.,J>Alfri PP* £33-5**Ot July 25, 1961.
8**teUG„ I t M f g 19,^ 1, p. 397, May 25, 1961.
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The Kennedy decision in this instance was to 
bolster U.S. defensive foveas in West Berlin. He could 
have ignored the Wall9 or he could have sent troops in to 
prevent farther Communist advancement •
I f  the Mall was ignored —  who coaid have possibly 
said what other Communist move night later go unchallenged. 
Bow far would the Communists have pushed before they reached 
the point where the 17.S. would have been forced to resist 
such advances or withdraw? To have Ignored the Mall would 
have opened the door for possible Communist gains in Germany.
In the event Kennedy sent troops to reinforce the 
American position in West Berlin and "face* was maintained 
by the American demonstration that her commitment would 
continue to hold* The Communists were thereby “reassured* 
that the U.S. under Kennedy, would not be forced back by 
moves such as the construction of the Berlin w a ll.
In October | 1962 f the American public was presented 
with the information that ninety miles south of the Florida 
coastline was a military installation capable of striking, 
with effective force, any major American city. The deci­
sion of the President was to establish and enforce a strict 
quarantine of the Island until such time as the missiles 
and military weapons were removed from the island. The 
quarantine was proclaimed on October 23, 1962 and put into 
effect on October 2**. The reason for the quarantine was, 
as in previous incidents, the security and freedom of the
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Western hemisphere.
file 9911 of freedom Is always high —  Wet 
Americans Have always paid it. And on© path 
we shall newer cheese, aad that is the pith 
of surrender or
the victory of might* hat the vindication of
right —  not pease'at the expense of freedom, 
hat both pease and freedom, here in this 
heaisphere9 and, we hope, around the world*0?
fhe stand taken by Kennedy raised the prospect 
that the tension existing between the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union might he essalated into a nuclear war. Action was 
considered necessary. Both the United States government 
and the government of the Soviet Union were faced with the 
possibility of confrontation with military destruction of 
the highest order, fhe resultant removal of Soviet missiles 
and military installations from the island of Cuba served 
to quiet the situation and to emphasize the American Pres­
ident's willingness to take' 'the action he deems necessary, 
as President, for the safety of the American nation and, as 
leader of the West, for the safety of the nations of the 
free world*
In this second Unban crisis, Kennedy was faced 
with six possible moves. He couldi H(l) do nothing| (2) 
bring diplomatic pressures and warnings to bear on the 
Sovietsf (3) wadertake a secret approach to Castro, to 
split him off from the Soviets, to warn him that the alter­
native was his Island's downfall and that the Soviets were 
selling him out§ (b) initiate Indirect military action by
8^aahllg.J>Jiail,J I , 1362, W* 806-809, October 22, 1962.
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means of a blockade* ($) conduct an air strike, pinpointed 
against the missiles only.or against other Military targets, 
with or without advance warning* or (6) launch an invasion."88
If Kennedy had dome nothing, the security of the 
United States would remain at stake. In the sane Instance,
If the missile build»up in Cuba had been Ignored, how much 
further would the Communists have pushed to gain strength 
In the Americas? If Kennedy had merely issued a warning, 
through diplomatic channels, there would have been no actual 
pressure exerted on the Soviets other than the pressure of 
words. Actions would undoubtably be forthcoming, but the 
Soviets would have received advance warning and could pos­
sibly be prepared for any such move on the part of the United 
States. If Kennedy had merely taken Castro aside end stated 
that the fate of Cuba hung In the balance of power struggle, 
the way would be olear for Castro to denounce the United 
States as an. aggressor, clting the Minformation" given him 
by Kennedy as proof*
fhe fourth course of action open to Kennedy was 
to initiate indirect military action in the form of a 
blockade* He took this course of action In the belief 
that such a show of strength and decisiveness on the part 
of the United States would serve to alert both the Soviets 
and Cubans and the nations of the latest to the faet that 
the United States was prepared and willing to take the
86t * Sorenson, "Kennedy vs. Khruschevi fhe Showdown in 
Cuba", Look, Vol. 19, No. 18, Sept. 7, 1965, p. 51.
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action considered necessary to preserve her security.
If Kennedy had taken the fifth or sixth courses 
of action ©pea to him he would have involved the United 
States in hand to hand, contest in Cuba* Either of the novas 
could easily have escalated the Soviets into a show of 
nuclear strength and ultimate nuclear annihilation*
fhe President had stated * in M s  campaign for the 
presidency and throughout his termf that the .asm in offiee 
had an obligation to the people to inform them of the facts* 
in the whole it can tee said that such was the case with 
the Kennedy Administration* the first Cuban crisis of 
1961 may dispute tMs9 bait the American public was even* 
twally given the facts* fhe Berlin, crisis of 1961 was re* 
ported to the American peoplef and the need for decisive 
American build-up in military forees was explained* fhe 
Cuban missile crisis of 1962 was explained to the public; 
the action taken was also clarified* President Kennedy 
seems to have followed.! perhaps not always consistently! 
the lines of conduct he posited as a candidate9 as teeing 
applicable to the President of the United States*
. Kennedy stated throughout M s  campaign .and M s  
years in the WMte House that peace m s  the objective of 
M s  action in the international arena* Peace was the ob­
jective as long as freedom was not denied* On duly 26f.
1963, Kennedy announced the eonelusions of negotiations 
for a medear test ban treaty* That treaty m s  signed in 
0etoteer.t 1963+ It represented the culmination of years of
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effort to reach an understanding and an agreement on the 
control of nuclear weapons* fhe treaty represented a 
step forward os the path toward eventual peace* The de­
cision to accept the treaty was not, strictly speaking, 
Kennedy*s alone, for it was the result of years of nego­
tiation and effort on the part of a somber of individuals. 
The final actios was taken by the President. He informed 
the public of the treaty and of the implications of that 
agreement. It was an achievement of his Administration 
and of the President himself* It might also be termed the 
partial fulfillment of his inaugural addresst
bet every nation know, whether it wishes us 
well or in, that we shall pay any price, 
bear any burden, meet any hardship, support 
any friend, oppose any foe to assure the 
survival and the success of liberty ... To 
those nations who would make themselves our 
adversary, we offer not a pledge but a re­
quest i that both sides begin anew the quest 
for peace, before the dark powers of destruc­
tion unleashed by science engulf all humanity 
in planned or accidental self-destruction ... 
let both sides explore what problems mite us 
instead of belabouring those problems which 
divide us* bet both sides, for the first time, 
formulate serious and precise proposals for 
the inspection and control of arms —  and 
bring the absolute power to destroy other 
nations under the absolute control of all 
nations ••• And if a beach-head of co­
operation may push, back the jungle of sus­
picion, let both sides join in creating a 
new endeavour, not a new balance of power, 
but a new world of law, where the strong are 
just and the weak secure and the peace pre­
served*®?
.jr-iatt, January 20, 1961, pp. 1-2*
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John F. Kennedy was elected President on November 
3i 1930 and was Inaugurated m  January 20, 1931. Kennedy 
m s  destined to serve two years, ten months, sad two days 
as President of the Waited States* Waring that time, the 
Halted States had managed to make noteworthy advances In 
the field of space exploration, some advance la the field 
of eivil rights, and had become more deeply Involved in 
seeking a detente with the Soviet Union. 1a adequate eval­
uation of Kennedy1* years In the tfhlte House cannot be made 
without consideration of the Alliance for Progress, the 
Peace Corps, and the wheat agreement with the Soviet Union. 
On the other hand, the Kennedy years were not all successful 
years. The failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the furor 
over a military installation on Cuba., the landing of troops 
In Laos and in Berlin, and increased American Involvement 
In Vietnam served to draw criticism toward the Administra­
tion. During those same years, Kennedy saw, In retrospect, 
a difference In action possible on the part of the Presi­
dent and a difference In his own concept of the office.
The problems were more difficult than I had 
imagined they were. There is (also) a limita­
tion upon the ability of the United States to
n
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solve these problems ••• tore Is a limitation
on t o  power of t o  United States to bring 
about solutions ... I weald say tot t o  prob­
lems are more difficult tot I had imagined 
tom to be* and tore are greater limitations 
upon our ability to bring about a favourable 
result ton I had imagined them to be* And I 
think tot is probably toe of anyone t o  be­
comes President, because tore is such a dif­
ference between those t o  advise or speak or 
legislate, and between t o  man t o  oust select 
from t o  various alternatives proposed end say 
■ tot this shall be t o  policy of t o  United 
States. It is much easier to make the speeches 
ton it is to ftelly make t o  judgments, because 
unfortunately your advisors are frequently di­
vided* If you take t o  wrong course, and on 
occasion I have, t o  President bears Jjbe burden 
of t o  responsibility quite rightly.88
It is possible, in looking over t o  achievements 
of t o  Kennedy Administration and in considering the set­
backs suffered during t o  Kennedy years, to conclude that 
Kennedy himself realized the responsibilities of his office, 
accepted those responsibilities, listened to his advisors, 
and made t o  final decisions himself*^ He did not solve 
all t o  problems facing t o  United States and t o  Free 
World, and was not able to accomplish all he intended to, 
but Kennedy did gain a greater respect for the power of the 
Congress^ and, at t o  same time, was able to evaluate his
a8P»bUt PiMai lattt ieesmbey 17, 1962, p. 889.
89S©e 26a, p. 12 —  Jacksonian statement on Presidential 
power and responsibility*
9Q«It is a tremendous change to go from being a Senator 
to being President ... t o  fact is I think t o  Congress 
looks more powerful sitting here than it did when I was 
tore in t o  Congress Wien you are in t o  Congress you 
are one of a hundred in t o  Senate or one of b p  in t o  House, 
so the power is divided* But here I look at the Congress and
I look at t o  collective power of t o  Congress, particularly 
t o  bloc action, and it Is a substantial power." 1M&., Pec- 
ember 17, 1962, p. 892.
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own legislative program*
They are two separate offices and two separate 
powers, the Congress and the Presidency* There 
Is bound to be conflict, but they most co­
operate to the degree that is possible* But 
that is why no President* s program is ever
fat in. The only time a President's program s pnt in quiekly and easily Is when the pro­
gram is insignificant. But if it is signif­
icant and afreets important interest and is 
controversial, therefore, then there is a 
fight, and the President is never wholly suc- 
cessful.91
President John P* Kennedy faced a number of set­
backs bat continued In the face of these disappointments 
to act as leader of the American nation and of the free 
world* He saw the Presidency as a goal to be gainedf he 
gained that goal and saw then the responsibility of leader­
ship. Be managed to combine legislative experience, and 
some degree of executive leadership in fulfilling the re­
sponsibilities of the Presidency as he saw them! to serve 
the people of the nation, "even with the risk, of incurring 
their momentary displeasure*1’ He was aware of the problems 
of the office and aware that he was not the sole answer*
"I had plenty of problems when I ease in, but wait until 
the fellow that follows m  sees what he will inherit.”?2
John f * Kennedy say not have been the greatest 
President the United States has seen or will see, bat the 
Kennedy years in the Whit# House will not soon be forgotten.
91W3,lt. »*«• 179 196a, p* B9b*
92BiU Adler, The, (Toronto, 196b), p*70*
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1 want above all else to be a President .known —  
at the end of four years —  as one who not only 
prevented war but won the peace —  as one of 
whoa history sight sayi he not only laid the 
foundations for peace In his time, bat for the 
generations to eoae as well ... X want to be a 
President known —  at the end of four years —  
as one who not only held back the Communiste o a e  a eo aa e  iw w w iw  m o t  ep ^ieesea»)ge aFep,*e>**e a a *  w  ^  ”
tide bat advanced the cause of freedom and re* 
built American prestige —  not by words but by 
works —  not by stating great aims merely as a 
good debater* bat by doing: great deeds as a 
good neighbour —  not. by loirs and conferences 
abroad, but by vitality and direction at hone ...
I want to be a President who will regain that
office for the people X want to be a Pres­
ident of all the people • X want to be a 
President who has the confidence of the people —  
and who takes the people Into his confidence —  
who lets then, know what he Is doing and where 
we are going* who Is for his program and who 
Is against I want to be a President who 
sets as well as reacts —  who originates pro­
grams as wen as study groups —  who masters 
comelex orobleats as well as <>«* ease memeran— 
dams X want to be a President who is the 
Chief Incentive In every sense of the word —  
who responds to a problem, not by hoping his 
subordinates will act, but by directing them 
to act —  a President who is willing to take 
the responsibility for getting things done, 
and take the blame If they are not done right •«*
X want to be a President who believes in working 
full *4««> of and women are
forced to work part time «•* X want to be a 
President who cares ••• X want to be a Presi­
dent who Is concerned ••• X want to be a Pres­
ident who recognises every eltisen's rights as 
wall as his obligations •*» X want to be the 
President of a country which raises the farmer's 
income instead of his costs • •• X believe in a 
President who will formulate and fight for his 
legislative policies ... A President who will 
not back down under pressure ... A President 
who does not speak from the rear of the battle 
but who places himself in the of the
fight :*«« X also believe in a President who 
fights for great ideals as well as legislation —  
a President who cares deeply about the people 
he represents —  their right to a full-time 
job with full-time pay —  to raise their chil­
dren In decent neighbourhoods —  to send their
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children to a good school *—  to share In 
the benefits of oar abundance and our 
natural resources —  and to retire to a 
life of dignity .and health ... Above all 
X believe In a President who believes In 
the national Interest —  who serves no 
other master —  who takes no instruction 
tut those of his conscience —  who puts no 
personal interest, no public pressure, no 
political hopes, and so private obligation 
of any kind ahead of his path to promote 
the national interest #**93
History will decide whether or not John F* Kennedy 
uni that President*
9^0oris S. Whitne |SSf
ttPEut L
n*hSiu»U|S *?«*■## 
lew fork Coliseum*
s made
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